Why is Sex Fun?: the evolution of human sexuality, стр. 23
What general validity do these conclusions possess? Hawkes and her colleagues studied just two hunter-gatherer peoples, the Ache and the Hadza. The resulting conclusions await testing of other hunter-gatherers. The answers are likely to vary among tribes and even among individuals. From my own experience in New Guinea, Hawkes's conclusions are likely to apply even more strongly there. New Guinea has few large animals, hunting yields are low, and bags are often empty. Much of the catch is consumed directly by the men while off in the jungle, and the meat of any big animal brought home is shared widely. New Guinea hunting is hard to defend economically, but it brings obvious payoffs in status to successful hunters.
What about the relevance of Hawkes's conclusions to our own society? Perhaps you're already livid because you foresaw that I'd raise that question, and you're expecting me to conclude that American men aren't good for much. Of course that's not what I conclude. I acknowledge that many (most? by far the most?) American men are devoted husbands, work hard to increase their income, devote that income to their wives and kids, do much child care, and don't philander.
But, alas, the Ache findings are relevant to at least some men in our society. Some American men do desert their wives and children. The proportion of divorced men who renege on their legally stipulated child support is scandalously high, so high that even our government is starting to do something about it. Single parents outnumber copar-ents in the United States, and most single parents are women.
Among those men who remain married, all of us know some who take better care of themselves than of their wives and children, and who devote inordinate time, money, and energy to philandering and to male status symbols and activities. Typical of such male preoccupations are cars, sports, and alcohol consumption. Much bacon isn't brought home. I don't claim to have measured what percentage of American men rate as show-offs rather than providers, but the percentage of show-offs appears not to be negligible.
Even among devoted working couples, time budget studies show that American working women spend on the average twice as many hours on their responsibilities (defined as job plus children plus household) as do their husbands, yet women receive on the average less pay for the same job. When American husbands are asked to estimate the number of hours that they and their wives each devote to children and household, the same time budget studies show that men tend to overestimate their own hours and to underestimate their wife's hours. It's my impression that men's household and child-care contributions are on the average even lower in some other industrialized countries, such as Australia, Japan, Korea, Germany, France, and Poland, to mention just a few with which I happen to be familiar. That's why the question what men are good for continues to be debated within our societies, as well as between anthropologists.
CHAPTER 6. MAKING MORE BY MAKING LESS: The Evolution of Female Menopause
Most wild animals remain fertile until they die, or until close to that time. So do human males: although some men become infertile or less fertile at various ages for various reasons, men experience no universal shutdown of fertility at any particular age. There are innumerable well-attested cases of old men, including a ninety-four-year-old, fathering children.
But human females undergo a steep decline in fertility from around age forty, leading to universal complete sterility within a decade or so. While some women continue to have regular menstrual cycles up to the age of fifty-four or fifty-five, conception after the age of fifty was rare until the recent development of medical technologies using hormone therapy and artificial fertilization. For example, among the American Hutterites, a strict religious community that is well nourished and opposed to contraception, women produce babies as fast as is biologically possible for humans, with a mean interval of only two years between births, and a mean final number of eleven children. Even Hutterite women stop producing babies by age forty-nine.
To laypeople, menopause is an inevitable fact of life, albeit often a painful one anticipated with foreboding. But to evolutionary biologists, human female menopause is an aberration in the animal world and an intellectual paradox. The essence of natural selection is that it promotes genes for traits that increase the number of one's descendants bearing those genes. How could natural selection possibly result in every female member of a species carrying genes that throttle her ability to leave more descendants? All biological traits are subject to genetic variation, including the age of human female menopause. Once female menopause somehow became fixed in humans for whatever reason, why did not its age of onset gradually become pushed back until it disappeared again, because those women who experienced menopause later in life left behind more descendants?
To evolutionary biologists, female menopause is thus among the most bizarre features of human sexuality. As I shall argue, it is also among the most important. Along with our big brains and upright posture (emphasized in every text of human evolution), and our concealed ovula-tions and penchant for recreational sex (to which texts devote less attention), I believe that female menopause was among the biological traits essential for making us distinctively human-a creature more than, and qualitatively different from, an ape.
Many biologists would balk at what I have just said. They would argue that human female menopause does not pose an unsolved problem, and that there is no need to discuss it further. Their objections are of three types.
First, some biologists dismiss human female menopause as an artifact of a recent increase in human expected life span. That increase stems not just from public health measures within the last century but possibly also from the rise of agriculture ten thousand years ago, and even more likely from evolutionary changes leading to increased human survival skills within the last forty thousand years. According to this view, menopause could not have been a frequent occurrence for most of the several million years of human evo-lution, because (supposedly) almost no women or men survived past the age of forty. Of course, the female reproductive tract was programmed to shut down by age forty, because it would not have had the opportunity to operate thereafter anyway. The increase in human life span has developed much too recently in our evolutionary history for the female reproductive tract to have had time to adjust-so goes this objection.
However, this view ignores the fact that the human male reproductive tract, and every other biological function of both women and men, continue to function in most people for many decades after age forty. One would therefore have to assume that every other biological function was able to adjust quickly to our new long life span, leaving unexplained why female reproduction was uniquely incapable of doing so. The claim that formerly few women survived until the age of menopause is based on paleode-mography, that is, on attempts to estimate age at time of death in ancient skeletons. Those estimates rest on un-proven, implausible assumptions, such as that the recovered skeletons represent an unbiased sample of an entire ancient population, or that ancient adult skeletons really can be aged accurately. While paleodemographers' ability to distinguish the ancient skeleton of a ten-year-old from that of a twenty-five-year-old is not in question, the ability they claim to distinguish an ancient forty-year-old from a fifty-five-year-old has never been demonstrated. One can hardly reason by comparison with skeletons of modern people, whose different lifestyles, diets, and diseases surely make their bones age at different rates from the bones of ancients.