11 сентября 2001, стр. 63

• the type of steel floor truss system present in these buildings and their structural robustness and redundancy when compared to other structural systems

• use of impact-resistant enclosures around egress paths

• resistance of passive fire protection to blasts and impacts in buildings designed to provide resistance to such hazards

• grouping emergency egress stairways in the central building core, as opposed to dispersing them throughout the structure

During the course of this study, the question of whether building codes should be changed in some way to make future buildings more resistant to such attacks was frequently explored. Depending on the size of the aircraft, it may not be technically feasible to develop design provisions that would enable all structures to be designed and constructed to resist the effects of impacts by rapidly moving aircraft, and the ensuing fires, without collapse. In addition, the cost of constructing such structures might be so large as to make this type of design intent practically infeasible.

Although the attacks on the World Trade Center are a reason to question design philosophies, the BPS Team believes there are insufficient data to determine whether there is a reasonable threat of attacks on specific buildings to recommend inclusion of such requirements in building codes. Some believe the likelihood of such attacks on any specific building is deemed sufficiently low to not be considered at all. However, individual building developers may wish to consider design provisions for improving redundancy and robustness for such unforeseen events, particularly for structures that, by nature of their design or occupancy, may be especially susceptible to such incidents. Although some conceptual changes to the building codes that could make buildings more resistant to fire or impact damage or more conducive to occupant egress were identified in the course of this study, the BPS Team felt that extensive technical, policy, and economic study of these concepts should be performed before any specific code change recommendations are developed. This report specifically recommends such additional studies. Future building code revisions may be considered after the technical details of the collapses and other building responses to damage are better understood.

2.4 Recommendations

The scope of this study was not intended to include in-depth analysis of many issues that should be explored before final conclusions are reached. Additional studies of the performance of WTC 1 and WTC 2 during the events of September 11, 2001, and of related building performance issues should be conducted. These include the following:

• During the course of this study, it was not possible to determine the condition of the interior structure of the two towers, after aircraft impact and before collapse. Detailed modeling of the aircraft impacts into the buildings should be conducted in order to provide understanding of the probable damage state immediately following the impacts.

• Preliminary studies of the growth and heat flux produced by the fires were conducted. Although these studies provided useful insight into the buildings' behavior, they were not of sufficient detail to permit an understanding of the probable distribution of temperatures in the buildings at various stages of the event and the resulting stress state of the structures as the fires progressed. Detailed modeling of the fires should be conducted and combined with structural modeling to develop specific failure modes likely to have occurred.

• The floor framing system for the two towers was complex and substantially more redundant than typical bar joist floor systems. Detailed modeling of these floor systems and their connections should be conducted to understand the effects of localized overloads and failures to determine ultimate failure modes. Other types of common building framing should also be examined for these effects.

• The fire-performance of steel trusses with spray-applied fire protection, and with end restraint conditions similar to those present in the two towers, is not well understood, but is likely critical to the building collapse. Studies of the fire-performance of this structural system should be conducted.

• Observation of the debris generated by the collapse of the towers and of damaged adjacent structures suggests that spray-applied fire proofing may be vulnerable to mechanical damage from blasts and impacts. This vulnerability is not well understood. Tests of these materials should be conducted to understand how well they withstand such mechanical damage and to determine whether it is appropriate and feasible to improve their resistance to such damage.

• In the past, tall buildings have occasionally been damaged, typically by earthquakes, and experienced collapse within the damaged zones. Those structures were able to arrest collapse before they progressed to a state of total collapse. The two WTC towers were able to arrest collapse from the impact damage, but not from the resulting fires when combined with the impact effects of the aircraft attacks. Studies should be conducted to determine, given the great size and weight of the two towers, whether there are feasible design and construction features that would permit such buildings to arrest or limit a collapse, once it began.

2.5 References

BBC News. 2001. «We Ran for Our Lives.» Account of Mike Shillaker. September 13.

Cauchon, D. 2001a. «For Many on Sept. 11, Survival Was No Accident,» USA Today.com. December 19. Cauchon, D. 2001b. «Four Survived by Ignoring Words of Advice,» USA Today.com. December 19. Computers and Structures, Inc. (CSI). 2000. SAP-2000. Berkeley, CA. Dateline NBC. 2001. «The Miracle of Ladder Company 6.» September 28. Hearst, D. 2001. «Attack on America: Survivors: Suddenly they started to yell out, `get out now': Bravery and fear mingled with disbelief,» Guardian Home Pages, page 15. Account of Simon Oliver. September 13.

Labriola, J. 2001. Personal account. Channel 4 News, «Inside the World Trade Center,» broadcast. September 13.

Masetti, A. 2001. Personal account received by email. December 21. Mayblum, A. 2001. Personal account. www.worldtradecenternews.org/survivorstory.html, World Trade Center Miracles section. September 18.

New York Board of Fire Underwriters. 1975. One World Trade Center Fire, February 13, 1975. Nicholson, W. J.; Rohl, A. N.; Wesiman, I.; and Seltkoff, I.J. 1980. Environmental Asbestos Concentrations in the United States, page 823. Environmental Sciences Laboratory, Mount Zion Hospital, New York, NY.

Scripps, H. 2001. «I walked out... I made it out alive,» Boston Herald.com. Account of John Walsh. September 14.

Shark, G., and McIntyre, S. December 5, 2001. ABS. Personal account. Smith, D. 2002. Report from Ground Zero. Viking Penguin, New York. p. 29. Zalosh, R. G. 1995. «Explosion Protection,» SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 2nd edition. Quincy, MA.

Isn't it comforting that a supposedly scientific article about the collapse of the WTC (apart from articles on the 1975 WTC fire) only quotes survival stories from media sources?

The author of the comments (italic) is unknown. This is one of many pages, mostly concerning 9/11, which appeared anonymously during 2002-2003 at nerdcities.com/guardian/. The website disappeared in April 2003, but is preserved at http://thewebfairy.com/nerdcities/.